“Muller, clearly losing all sense of academic propriety, has now taken to associating himself with the uninformed and bitter mutterings of Vox Day.” – Michelle Malkin
Bad professor! Bad!
Dear Ms Malkin,
As you did not respond substantively to any of the points I raised in my column or my first email to you, I am addressing the following questions directly to you.
1. I have asserted that there was no reasonable risk of invasion.
This opinion is supported by modern military experts. You have
written that “the risk of full-scale invasion was low”. Did this
“low” risk alone justify the internment?
2. Was the number of troops stationed in California, Oregon and
Washington in February 1942 sufficient to deal with Japan’s
trans-Pacific troop transport capacity?
3. The production figures for 1940 through 1945 show a significant
delta between the United States and Japan. Could sabotage have
accounted for enough damage to, as you suggest, potentially
cripple the war effort, and what percentage of lost production
would you describe as “crippling”?
4. Did this potential risk of sabotage alone justify the
5. Was the potential for cumulative damage from sabotage and spot
raids on the West Coast greater or less than the cumulative
damage to Germany wrought by the Allied bombing campaign of
Germany in 1943 and 1944?
6. 160 planes were destroyed at Pearl Harbor. Based on 1940-41
production figures, how long did it take to replace those planes
and how many planes were left to American forces?
7. Were any subsequent “spot raids” likely to cause more or less
damage than Pearl Harbor?
8. Considering that the Japanese lost 29 planes in the Pearl Harbor
attack, what is the probable number of spot raids they could
have made with the three carriers you cite were available to
them for use in such a capacity in 1942?
9. Since German military production increased 278 percent from 1942
to 1944 while being bombed on a daily and nightly basis, while
US production increased only 206 percent over the same period,
is it reasonable to assume that Japanese spot raids would have
slowed US production or the war effort at all? If your answer is
yes, please explain how and why.
10. Did the risk of these potential spot raids alone justify
Please provide clear, specific and unevasive answers to these questions; you can offer qualifiers, explanations and assertions of whatever you like in a separate rebuttal.